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Winter navigation in the Bothnian Bay is a subject that
continues to be discussed both among professionals, and in the
news media. This is particularly true in late fall and early
spring. All the parties involved have participated in this
discussion: the industry, the Government and municipal
administrators, and the shipowners. Naturally, each party
tries to promote his own interests in what seems to him the
most effective way. Consequently, at times the crux of the
matter seems to have been forgotten. Winter navigation in the
Bothnian Bay should first and foremost provide an economical
mode of transporting goods so that three important qualities
of transportation are ensured: dependability, speed, and
low cost. The chronic discontent concerning winter naviga-
tion in the Bothnian Bay implies that these qualities have
not been fully attained. Actual navigation appears at times
to have been neglected in the discussion concerning the
Bothnian Bay. After all, it is the ships that perform the
transportation. Therefore it seems impossible to solve the
problem without clarifying the role of navigation itself.
The Foundation for Navigation has given the present writer
the task to compile this memorandum, the purpose of which
is to try to bring out navigational considerations.
As we begin to study the problems involved, we will
soon realize that it is an extremely complex matter involving
many groups. An individual person within this limited program
can only superficially deal with the various aspects of the
matter. It has been my aim to collect a rather limited
amount of selected data, and avoid the historical background,
which may not be of interest in this connection.
I want to express my sincere gratitude to the following
experts who have without exception displayed great interest










































In addition, I want to thank Oy Finnlines Ltd. Without
their sympathetic help this memorandum could not have been
written.




1. Winter in the Bothnian Bay
Winter in the Bothnian Bay is longer and more severe
than the winter in the Sea of Bothnia or in the Gulf of
Finland. As a result, the Bothnian Bay freezes in its
entirety even in mild winters. The junction between the
Bothnian Bay and the Sea of Bothnia, called Merenkurkku,
freezes on the average at the beginning of January and thaws
on the first of May. The northern shore waters freeze about
the 20th of December and thaw around the 20th of May.
The number of.so-called ice days in Merenkurkku is about
100 and it increases up to 190 as you go north. These
figures are two times greater than in the Gulf of Finland.
The ice is thickest during March and April. It is 75 cm
thick in Ajos and 50 cm in Vaasa. The ice increases in
thickness slowly but melts 3 or 4 times faster. For ice to
reach its full thickness takes about 4 months but the final
thawing takes place much faster. During the last three
weeks, about 90% of the ice will melt.
Freshwater ice is stronger than saltwater ice. This is
because salt collects in salt water pockets in the ice.
Also the lower temperature of the ice increases its strength.
The concentration of salt in the Bothnian Bay is comparatively
low; about 3 or 4 parts per thousand. Freshwater ice
at -20C can be two times stronger than 0.4/1,000 ice at -3C.
Unfortunately, information about the effective pressure of
ice masses against the sides of the ship has not been available.
This is simply because no one has studied it.
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2. Sea Transportation in the Bothnian Bay
In 1968 the volume of sea transportation in the
Bothnian Bay was 4.30 million tons, which was 16% of the
total sea transportation of the whole country. Export was
2.79 million tons, or 26% of the total for the country.
Import was 1.51 million tons or 9.5% of the total. This
was divided between 12 different ports. Yet we have to
realize that 90% of the whole traffic goes through 5 ports:
Kemi, Oulu, Kokkola, Pietarsaari, and Rautaruukki. About
half goes through only two of them: Kemi and Oulu.
The transported goods fall into three main groups:
wood products, mining and mineral products, and oil.
All these share the problems caused by the winter season
and yet their problems are not similar. The goal of the
wood product industry is economical continuity of exports.
In 1968 the wood products industry of the Bothnian Bay
produced about 950,000 tons of cellulose and 230,600 tons
of paper and cardboard. Because the degree of processing
will rise in future, the figures will change accordingly.
An essential part of this need for transportation falls
in the winter, which emphasizes the importance of winter
traffic for the wood refining industry of the North of
Finland. The common notion that transportation is necessary
only in the summer is unfortunately not true as far as the
vitally important wood processing industry is concerned.
The main problem concerning oil and other imported fuel
is the transportation and storage costs. In 1968 Bothnian
Bay ports received about 1,100,000 tons of oil, or about 30%
of all oil imported by sea. Sea transportation added with
winter allowances and above all storage costs during the 5
winter months is clearly a more economical way to take care
of the oil needs of northern Finland than to transport it
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by railroads at 25 Finnmarks/ton (1). On the other hand,
in considering storage problems one has to take general
production and safety considerations into account.
Finland's mining and mineral industry involve both import
and export. Raw materials and finished products are completely
different. It is possible to store raw materials and even the
semi-finished products of the metal industry. Each year
about a quarter of a million tons of ore, coke, etc. sail in
and out of the hargors of the Bothnian Bay. The finished
products, above all steel, are not storable. In 1968,
388,872 tons of iron bars and 64,326 tons of sheets were
transported by ship. Steel sheets in particular are difficult
to store because they are sold in small amounts.
In spite of that they are heavy packages (from 5 to 40
tons). The improvised winter harbors have to be especially
equipped for this. Similarly, the small ships suitable for
carrying steel products will be the first to suffer from
the restrictions imposed each fall by the Board of Navigation.
Oulu and Kemi will serve as examples of winter
navigation in the Bothnian Bay. From the year 1963 up to
1967, the winter season has lasted an average of 5 months
and 3 weeks. Fall assistance has lasted for two months and
the harbors have been entirely closed for three months on the
average.
(1) The Finnmark (Fink): $1.00 = 4.25 Finnmarks (1965).
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3. Organization of Winter Navigation
The year is divided into 4 seasons: season of fall
assistance, the closed season, season of spring assistance,
and the summer season. The Bureau of Navigation determines
the seasons according to developments from the first
appearance of ice. The Bureau uses traffic restrictions
to control winter navigation. These restrictions are com-
parable to those on thawing highways. In fall the restric-
tions naturally increase toward a complete standstill.
In spring the order is reversed. From 1965 on two parameters
have been used (2): the size of ships and the ice class.
There are three size groups: 700 dwt, 900 dwt and 2000 dwt.
These classes have naturally their own practical counter-
parts. In theory there are five ice classes: Class II or
the unreinforced, and classes IC, IB, IA, and IA Super.
In practice, IB is combined with either class IC or class
IA. IA-Super has not been used.
New restrictions become effective within 3 days after
their publication. This time is considered sufficient for
emptying the area of the ships under the restriction.
Exceptions are allowed only by special permission of the
Director of Traffic. In practice, this concerns only tankers.
Neither cancellation of restrictions nor opening of harbors
are announced ahead of time. This no doubt inconveniences
both shipowners and industry because it disturbs rational
planning of both transportation and production. For instance,
the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway is made public long
before (3).
(2) Institute of Marine Research: Ice Forecasts
(3) The same seems to be true of the Saimaa Canal.
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In the freight agreements signed by shipowners and the
suppliers of freight there is no actual legal ruling con-
cerning the traffic restrictions of harbors. It is evident
that a sudden opening of a harbor imposes a strain. At
times problems concerning labor relations in harbors have
not been solved before the arrival of the first ship.
Consequently, the first ship has not been received with
cheers. Instead, the harbor has been on strike.
Because the closing and opening of harbors is absolute,
and because it depends on the decision of the Bureau of
Navigation, the position of the Bureau of Navigation is
important in winter navigation, and has great commercial
significance. During the closing period, the icebreakers
wage a delaying battle, withdrawing southwards, later to
counterattack in spring. It is obvious that this tactic
programed by the ice is not quite the optimal program needed
for the transportation system of the whole country. The
navigational restrictions and final closing of harbors
naturally cause a thorough change in the transport system
of the Bothnian Bay. Part of the traffic ends. Part of it
is directed to the southern most harbors, with railroad
transport holding they keep position. Significant in
this situation are the choice of winter harbors and the
freight policy of the railroads with their winter reductions.
The closed harbors are left without jobs and the municipalities
have to register harbor expenses instead of harbor income
because of the aid to the unemployed. The costs of industry
increase because of higher transport and storage costs.
The costs to the shipowners also increase because of the
slowness, and actual damages caused by navigation in ice
during the period of assistance. The expenses to the state
increase because it maintains an expensive icebreaker fleet.
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In Sweden, the assistance has been organized somewhat
differently (4). The icebreakers belong to the Navy and
their winter operations are led by the Director of Icebreaking
Operations in the Royal Board of Navigation. He is assisted
in each harbor by an agent. The restriction system is
similar in principle, but more flexible. They use expressions
(5) like Finnish Ice Class IA or a corresponding one, or
Ice Reinforced Ship of 900 dwt. Officially they do not
recognize ice classes but they have started to use these as
a technical tool. Closing of harbors is also more flexible
than with us. The icebreaker costs are about 18 million
marks(6). The Government Icebreaker Bureau rents individual
tug ships for icebreaking purposes. This makes about 20% of
all operational costs. The government does not collect an
ice fee.
(4) Redogorelse fd3r Sveriges statliga is Grytar verksamhef
(5) Sveriges meteorologiska odr hydrologiska institut:
is Ger~tteise 10.2. 1969.
(6) De statliga Sjbfarts avgifterna. Betsnhande av givet
&r 1968 av sjofarts utredningen.
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II. STRUCTURAL STRENGTHENING OF SHIPS AGAINST ICE
A normal ship, built according to the requirements of
the classification society, belongs to ice fee class II.
According to ice strengthening rules that go back to 1930,
the basic measurements are given in percentile increments.
This is how the ice classes IC, IB, and IA and last of all
IA-Super (1965) were formed. This system is important in
the winter navigation of our country. It has proved useful
to navigation controllers, insurance companies and shipowners.
However, the basis for the regulations is not the pressure
of ice or the load caused by ice against the hull of the
ship. The basis is the norm of the classification society,
which is based on open water conditions.
In addition, surprisingly great differences in strength
are known to exist between different ships even though
they have identical ice reinforcement certificates. This
is due to the development of basic measurements and differences
that stand out when magnified by the percentile method.
The old regulations are subject to criticism from other points
of view as well.
In June 1968 the Cabinet formed a committee to set up
new ice reinforcement rules and to study their costs. The
Cabinet intends to publish the suggested regulations in
February 1970 and to enact them on December 1, 1970. The
basis for the regulations will be the pressure against
the hull of the ship. This can be regarded as the right
principle and the new regulations will no doubt be an
improvement. Nevertheless, the ice reinforcement of ships
always means changing the optimal structures, which are
made for open water. Ice reinforcement weakens a ship's
technical and commercial characteristics. Neither can ice
reinforcements alone solve the technical and commercial
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problem of winter navigation because the merchant ship is a
vehicle of transportation functioning in the field of inter-
national competition. Obviously, no ice reinforcement can
give a merchant ship enough strength against ice pressure
in all conditions. Only an icebreaker can meet this
requirement.
The new regulations also aim at taking the size of the
ship into consideration. In the final analysis, it is the
strength of the ship that matters. A bigger ship is naturally
stronger than a smaller ship. The restriction system adopted
by the Board of Navigation is also based on this fact.
Now there are 5 ice classes and 3 size classes. Theoretically,
these can produce 15 different ship models. To control
these may not be easy. The selection seems unnecessarily
large. So far no one has been able to state what kind of
reinforcement is necessary in a given navigational situation.
First of all, ships should be optimized so as to clear the
traffic restrictions imposed by the Board of Navigation.
These again fluctuate according to weather conditions, etc.
The new ice reinforcement regulations are based on the
analysis of the damage statistics of a classification society.
Thus, it has been possible to define some kind of nominal
ice pressure for which the scantlings of a ship are specified.
Thus, structural design can be more rational, unnecessary
reinforcement can be eliminated, and more can be added where
needed. So far, however, we do not know what ice proof
merchant ships would be like or what would be the best ship
for a certain purpose. There is practical evidence that
heavy reinforcements become more expensive because the
damages also will be heavy and the cost of repairs considerable.
There are also cases of over-reinforced ships. It is clear
that the ship designer is duty-bound to aim at optimal
structures. This is also true of ice reinforcements.
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Ice reinforcement is the cause of additional costs both in
shipbuilding and in repair work. It diminishes both the
deadweight of a ship and the capacity of its hold, while
downgrading the quality of the hold, which today is of
prime importance to the customers of shipowners. Also the
ice reinforcements diminish the resale value of the ship
because in Greece or India prospective buyers would consider
the reinforcement an outright burden.
In order to improve the winter characteristics of ships,
more is needed than just strengthening the hull of the propeller
against ice. The right ballast and heeling, propeller and
rudder structures, supply of water for the condenser, prepared-
ness for the so-called standard backing power, modern communi-
cations, etc. are important both for the ship itself and for
a successful management of navigation generally. Also, it
might be wise to consider possibilities for repair and
docking in case of emergency. It may turn out to be necessary
to dock the ship because of a damage to the propeller before
she can continue from Finland to the South of the Baltic Sea.
It would be good to obtain recommendations for this type of
problem because most shipbuilders do not know anything about
them.
In the last 10 years, a brand new ice breaker fleet has
been built. The ice breaker and the merchant ship can be
considered as one machine whose parts should dovetail into a
common whole. In practice we have seen, however, that the
merchant ship is the weak link of this machine. Unfortunately,
as the effectiveness of ice breakers has grown, so have ice
damages, because it has been possible to assist a ship into
more difficult ice conditions than before.
There has been no actual technical research so far in
this field. For instance, we have no information about the
amount of pressure of the ice mass against the sides of the
ships.
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III THE COSTS OF WINTER NAVIGATION
1. Ice Damages
Ice damages are common in ships that navigate in winter.
Damages can occur in the hull, the rudder, the propeller,
and more rarely, in the engine. The most serious are the
shell indents in the middle of the ship.
In the severe winter of 1965-66, the insurance refunds
in this area were about 4 1/2 million Fmk (7). The Finnish
Association of Ship Owners has studied ice damages in the
districts of Oulu and Kemi in the winters of 1965-66 and
1966-67 (8). It has gathered information on ice damages
that took place during two weeks at the end of Fall and the
beginning of Spring. In 1965-66 the damages were 252,000 Fmk
or 6 marks per transported ton. And in 1966-67, 1,156,786 Fmk,
or 15 marks per transported ton, were spent on ice damage
repair.
Unfortunately, there are no statistics available that
would classify ice damages according to time and locality.
Foreign ship statistics are totally unavailable. There is
no reason to assume that their damages are smaller than those
of the Finnish ships. In this connection it has not been
feasible to attempt to collect such data. The memorandum of
the Ship Owners Association has received rather aggressive
criticism from some, even though the critics have not made
any attempt to show that the information given in the memoran-
dum is erronious. The frequent remarks that the Association
has collected the data itself and that the foreigners are not
included are certainly not any fault of the Association.
The following is a list of ice claims illustrating the
nature of such damages.
(7) Lars Beckman: "On Ship Insurance," Naiatr March 1969.
(8) Finnish Association of Ship Owners, Memorandum of Winter
Navigation in the Gulf of Bothnia. November 1967.
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The most difficult damage known to the present writer
occurred to M/S Kaipola on the 21st and 22nd of February
1963 on the Sea of Bothnia. The dock repair bill was
420,519 Fmk and the ship was out of traffic for 6 weeks.
The gross freight was about 150,000 Fmk. In addition to the
technical repair bill, there are considerable general costs
due to docking. In addition to this there are the costs
due to the actual interruption in navigation. In order to
estimate the length of repair periods, we might use as
















Apr 7-14/64 from Pietarsaari
Jan 17-20/67 to Kemi
Mar 28-30/67 to Leppsluoto
Apr 24-26/67 from Kemi
Apr 26-29/67 to Oulu
Jan 16/67 to Oulu and Kemi
May 8-10/67 to Kemi
Feb 26/68 to Ykspihlaja
May 6-11/68 to Oulu and Kemi
Feb 15/64 to Ykspihlaja
Feb 26/68 to Ykspihlaja



























The median value of the above damages
cases) is about 65 marks per ton, with M/S




We may conclude that ice damages are rather expensive.
Even in moderate cases, the total costs of the damages make
a considerable part of the gross freight and in the most
severe cases the cost can be many times greater than the
gross freight. The question arises whether there is any
sense in making trips like this.
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Suspicions about other damages being listed as ice
damages are totally unfounded. In principle, damages to a
ship can be of three kinds: storm, contact, or ice damage.
The shipowner has no interest in trying to make ice damages
appear bigger than other damages. On the contrary, till
very recently, 25% of ice damages have been the shipowners'
own responsibility.
Obviously, identification and classification of damages
is an important stage at the beginning of docking. In the
inspection there are always 3 main participants: the represen-
tatives of the insurance company, the classification society,
and the shipowner. This procedure is generally accepted
and guarantees fairness to all concerned.
The damages discovered in the inspection are of various
kinds. The inspector of the classification association can
recommend that they be repaired immediately in the annual
docking, in connection with classification, or the matter
can be postponed till the next docking, or it can be left
for the shipowner to decide. The accomplishment of a ship's
repair work is of course incumbent on the functional considera-
tions of the shipowner. There is no sense in keeping the ship
unnecessarily out of commission because of an unessential
repair job if this can be done better, quicker, and cheaper
at a later date. Because of this kind of inspection and repair
system, the damages cannot be repaired immediately, one after
the other. A damage can be up to 12 years old before it is
repaired.
Also the immediate discovery of the damages is often im-
possible. Damages can occur in the dark, under the water or
under the cargo, or in some other concealed way. For these
reasons it is not always possible to inspect ships even though
damages are suspected.
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Observations hardly support the view that a stronger
ship has fewer ice damages. In the fleet of Oy Finnlines
Ltd, which has 10 ships in each ice class, the IA class
ships have suffered more ice damages than the other two
classes combined. The only rational explanation for this
is that the IA ships are called upon to sail more frequently
in severe ice conditions.
It is unfortunate that statistics of ice damages are
not available. According to the Shipowners' Association
study mentioned above, the ice damages on an average were
11.66' Fmk per transported metric ton over the winter season.
Note also.that the damages were 2 1/2 times bigger per trans-
ported ton in a mild winter than in a severe winter.
In addition, sailing in ice .causes other extra costs
like expenditures of time, labor, and fuel. According to
the Shipowners' Association these costs have also been con-
siderable, i.e., 5.83 marks per ton on an average.
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2. Ice Insurance
The ice damage risk of IA ships used to be included in
the inclusive insurance with 25% deductible. Accordingly,
the insurance company paid 75% of the damages. This has
undoubtedly influenced the structure of the ice-reinforced
tonnage of Finland. The insurance companies did grant
inclusive ice insurance also to the IB and IC ships but the
rate of insurance was high. Especially Class IB has been
neglected because of this. Because the above system had its
defects, it has been improved in recent years.
Since 1968, all ice reinforced ships can be insured
in Finland, and the 25% liability has been abolished. The
smallest damage to be reimbursed may be 50 pennies per
gross ton plus 250 marks but it may not exceed 3,000 marks.
In practice this lower limit has not had significance because
the ice damage is always bigger. In the new system, IA
ships pay a certain insurance fee and the fees for other
classes are escalated from this basis. This seems illogical
and does not quite correspond to the division of damages
to the various classes.
Because insurance fees are determined according to
damage statistics, the ice damages will eventually have to
be paid by shipowners, and ultimately by the industry.
The improved ice breakers have increased the number of
damages progressively. Both ice insurance and sailing in
ice are often foolish because the ice conditions are not
known. Neither do the navigation restrictions of the Board
of Navigation or the ice reinforcement classifications
give any guarantee against damages. The icebreakers have
practically no chance to protect the merchant ships.
For instance, in the case of M/S Finnseal mentioned
above, the ship reached Kemi all right, but during the return
trip in the South of the Bothnian Bay it was severely damaged.
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Opening a channel to a harbor may only mean that the icebreaker
has reached the harbor in question, because under certain con-
ditions the channel closes in after the ice breaker.
With us in Finland insurance is usually taken as an
annual insurance. There are also insurances for an individual
voyage which are, however, comparatively more expensive.
In Sweden, the procedure is different. The Swedish
Steamship Insurance Association publishes perhaps once or
twice a week an insurance index that covers the whole of
the Baltic by districts. These districts have been classified
from forbidden areas to clear water, with 10 different insur-
ance levels. Technically, the ships have been divided into
2 classes, I and II only, according to length over and under
75 meters. The insurance fee is .a certain part of the
insurance value of the ships added with increment by size,
(in Class I per gross ton and in Class II per deadweight ton).
This system is cumbersome although it does try to be realistic.
Evaluating the risk, and following it up are obviously difficult
tasks. It is to be noted that the ice reinforcement classes
are not used here.
In cases of damage the question of liability comes up
as well. The Board of Navigation has published instructions
to ships that require assistance (9). Points 1, 7 and 8 are
as following:
1. The orders of the icebreaker have to be obeyed.
7. A ship that does not follow these instructions or the
orders given by an icebreaker or its commander cannot
expect to get assistance of icebreaker.
8. The Government and the icebreaker are not responsible
for the ship being late, damaged, or suffering other losses
because of ice conditions, nor in the event these losses
are suffered by her crew, passengers, or cargo.
(9) Government Icebreakers, Appendix to TM leaflet, No. 33/1968.
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The captain is always responsible for the ship, passengers,
and cargo whether it is a matter of navigation or any other
kind of safety including ice conditions. Yet, it is under-
standable that the commander of an icebreaker needs a certain
authority in order to lead an entire convoy. On the other
hand, these instructions are clearly conflicting with the
responsibility of the captain of the ship. The captain will
be in a difficult situation if he is denied authority over his
own ship, while his responsibilities are undiminished. It
is evident that the captain cannot refuse to do his duty even
in this case.
The Board of Navigation as the supreme overseer of the
merchant marine also acts indirectly as prosecutor. It
seems nevertheless strange that the Board of Navigation has to
do this even when the damage in ice traffic was possibly
caused by an icebreaker. At the same time, the Board of
Navigation directs the operations of the icebreakers and is
responsible for them. This matter also seems to call for
further study.
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3. Winter Navigation Fees
Winter navigation causes both the Government and the
harbors additional costs. This is the reason why the ships
are charged a so-called ice fee. The ships are divided into
ice fee classes which is the real name of the ice reinforce-
ment classes. The Government charges the fee according to the
ice class of the ship with the so-called lighthouse fee between
Dec. 1 and April 30. The ice fees for each visit to Finland are:
IA Super -- marks per net ton
IA -- marks per net ton
IB 0.225 marks per net ton
IC 0.345 marks per net ton
Because IA Class ice fee is zero, a 50% reduction of the
lighthouse fee has been granted to the IA Super Class. This
amounts to 0.30 mks/NRT.
The harbors charge a winter fee which is 0.126 mks/NRT.
In the harbors of the Gulf of Bothnia the fee is charged
during the following periods.
Kokkola Nov 1-Apr 30
Oulu Oct 15-May 15
Kemi and Tornio Oct 15-May 31
In order to evaluate the significance and comparative
value of these fees, we can easily compute them in a few
cases as examples.
1. A North Sea Ship
2500/3700 dwt
1700/2700 GRT, 750/1400 NRT, OSD/CSD
Ice Class IA
2. A Mediterranean Ship
4600/6100 dwt
3000/4800 GRT, 1400/2500 NRT, OSD/CSD
3. An American Ship
7700/9500 dwt
5500/7700 GRT, 2800/4300 NRT, OSC/CSD
Note: GRT: gross registered tons; NRT: net registered tons
OSD: open shelter decker; CSD: closed shelter decker
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Class IA Super could be possible for a Sea of Bothnia
ship although there is no Finnish ship of this designation
in spite of the five year existence of this class. By com-
puting the reduction of the lighthouse fee, we realize that
it equals less than 2 days' daily costs and is 0.04% of a ship's
annual total expenditure. By computing the annual costs of
capital recovery, we realize that the capital can be amortized
in 15 years if the rate of interest is 1%. This does not
even begin to be sufficient for the amortization of the
expenses caused by reinforcement and operational costs during
the lifetime of a ship.
The following table shows what part of the annual expen-
diture of ships is made up of ice fees.
North Sea Mediterranean Atlantic
State Ice Fee -- 0.057% 0.040%
Harbor Ice Fee 0.145% 0.070% 0.022%
Total 0.145% 0.127% 0.062%
As shown, the ice fees are a trifling part in the total
budget of a ship and have no significance in defining the ice
class of a ship. We may ask why these fees are charges at
all. The zero fee should really begin at Class IC if its pur-
pose is to promote the building of reinforced ships. The ice
fees contribute a comparatively small amount to the operating
costs of icebreakers. It is 1% for the Bothnian Bay and
7% for the whole country.
The same is true also of the winter fees of harbors. If
the harbors want to encourage winter navigation, changing
winter fees is illogical. The immediate loss caused by a ship
that fails to come to the harbor is about 3,000 inks.
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The additional winter fee is from 100-350 mks in the
cases that served as examples above.
In Sweden where winter navigation has been arranged more
flexibly than here, the winter fees of the harbors have
been abolished in some cases in order to promote navigation.
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4. Winter Freightage
Because the voyage to the Bothnian Bay is longer than
to the South of Finland, the freight agreements grant so-
called zone allowances. For the winter season they also
pay a winter allowance.
These allowances are, in case of important articles of
export, about 5% plus 5%, that is, 5 Fmks per ton. Both
allowances have been intended to cover the longer trip and
the slower sailing in ice.
The harbors have also been divided into different zones,
which are not the same for all articles of export. It would
take too long to give their detailed description here.
Winter allowances are paid from the first of October
to the 14th of May (about 2.50 Fmk/ton). This timing seems
strange because Kemi and Oulu have not been closed once in
this decade before the New Year, while they have often
been opened before the middle of May.
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5. Ice Breakers
At the moment, we have the following ice breakers:
Name Year of Construction Engine Power
Sisu 1939 4,500 hp
Voima 1954 10,500 hp
Karhu 1958 7,500 hp
Murtaja 1959 7,500 hp
Sampo 1960 7,500 hp
Tarmo 1963 12,000 hp
Hanse(10) 1967 7,500 hp
Varma 1968 12,000 hp
Apu(11) 1970 12,000 hp
Ice breakers are specially built with the greatest
possible technical perfection. In this respect we have no
doubt made a great deal of progress.
The expenses of icebreakers have earlier been studied
by Erkki Palosuo(12), and at a later date by the Council of
Conveyance. The statistical supplement written by Pertti
Kukkonen and Islo Tikkanen(13) has been kindly made available
to me, although the text part is not yet quite finished.
I have attempted to pick from the extensive statistical
material only such information as pertains to merchant ships
in general and winter navigation in the Bothnian Bay in parti-
cular.
(10) Owned by the Federal Republic of Germany, but in Finnish
use according to agreement.
(11) Being finished in dock.
(12) Erkki Palosuo, The 0perational Costs of Ice Breakers in
Winter Navicgation,Vammala,16'.
(13) Pertti Kukkonen-Esko Tikkanen, The Costs and Acquisition
of Icebreakers,Statistical Supplements, Helsinki, 1969.
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We can see that icebreakers are both by price and by
operating expenses more expensive than merchant ships of
corresponding power. The following information will
illustrate the comparison. Because the consumption of fuel
in diesel engines of different types does not vary much,
there is not much difference between icebreakers and merchant
ships in this respect. Different types of engines again
demand different kinds of fuel. This difference is seen
in the cost of fuel. Ice breakers use as fuel so-called
POK - 10. This costs about 110 mk/ton(14). This fuel
corresponds qualitatively to the diesel oil used in merchant
ships which is known by the name "marine diesel," with
viscosity of about 40 Redwood degrees. Merchant ships gave
up using such expensive fuel quite some time ago, and the
new ships burn what is called heavy oil with viscosity of
about 1,500 up to 3,500 Redwood degrees at half the price
of the fuel used previously. In smaller engines intermediate
oil is used. Its viscosity is about 400 Redwood degrees and
its price about 70% of diesel oil. The fuel expenses of
icebreakers are about 1.25-1.45 pennies* per HP-hr.
The merchant ship of corresponding power has fueling
of 0.65 pennies/HP-hr. The ship using intermediate oil has
an expense of 1.10 pennies/HP-hr and a ship using diesel
oil 1.25 pennies/HP-hr.
As the engines of icebreakers develop 100,000,000
horsepower annually, the difference in cost is 650,000 Fmk/year,
compared to a merchant ship. Without reference to the choice
of fuel, we can see that the difference in cost is considerable.
In other respects, too, the conditions of icebreakers
differ from merchant ships. Their sailing hours are 1,500-
2,000 a year, depending on what the winter is like. Of this
time, they use 60% for actual assistance. The merchant ships
(14) All prices mentioned in the above study have been deflated
to the standard of 1960 by index per article.
* A penny = Finnmark/100.
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at sea 4,500-7,000 hours a year. They are out of commission
for repairs from 1 to 2 weeks a year. Icebreakers are usually
idle for 5 months of every year.
In the study mentioned above (Kukkonen-Tikkanen) we
can see that the icebreaker Tarmo's operating expenses were
890 Fmk per hour in 1967. Together with capital expenses
they are 2,090 Fmk per assistance hour.
Because it is the task of an icebreaker to assist, the
costs per assisted freight ton should be of interest. On
an average, these costs are probably 3.30 Fmk per ton. For
the harbors of Kemi, Oulu, and Raahe it probably is about
5.90 Fmk per ton. The operational costs for the same group
of harbors are 2.50 Fmk per ton.
The operational costs per ton very greatly in different
months. If individual assistance trips could be analyzed,
there would be even more variation. This is because cargoes
tend to be small at the beginning and at the closing of
the sailing season. The more severe conditions must also
have their role in this. In the mild winter of 1960-61,
the average operating costs were 0.24 Fmk per ton in the whole
country and 1.56 Fmk per ton in the Bothnian Bay. In
December 1960 they were 1.12 Fmk per ton, January 1961:
6.40 Fmk per ton, in March: 20.63 Fmk per ton and in April
13.40 Fmk per ton (15). The operational costs, then, can
amount to ten times the average costs. In the same winter,
Kemi was closed January 30 and opened March 25. We can es-
timate that the total costs before closing are about 10
Fmk per ton and after the opening 20 Fmk per ton.
One more difficulty facing winter navigation is the lack
of harbor icebreakers. It is clear that the Government
icebreaker is impractical and too expensive to be a harbor
icebreaker or a tow boat. This lack causes actual damages to
ships in addition to waste of time.
(15) 1961 monetary system.
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6. Railroads
When the harbors of the Bothnian Bay are frozen, exports
are transported by train to the more southern harbors. Only
export is studied here because it is by far the more important.
The export traffic of the Bothnian Bay amounts to 315,000-
355,000 tons per month in the summer. In winter, exports
of the industry on the Bothnian Bay amount to only half of
this.
Kaskinen is the best known of the winter harbors. Yet
only 1/3 to 1/4 of the Bothnian Bay winter export is shipped
through this harbor. The rest is divided between other
harbors of the south. The role of Kaskinen is important
but apparently not decisive. Its possibilities are limited
and improvised. The most obvious shortcomings are its limited
dock space, loading facilities and capacity for railway
transportation. The traffic of Kaskinen is 6% of the annual
traffic of the Bothnian Bay harbors. Considering modern
requirements, Kaskinen with its terminal traffic can scarcely
accommodate the trade of the developing Bothnian Bay industry.
To support industry, the State Railways have a freight
balance system according to which the State pays to the
State Railways reparations for freight reductions(16).
According to the report of the committee reparations are paid
for railroad freight, caused by the retreat in winter to the
southernmost harbors. The total sum of the reparations is
about 950,000 Fmk per year. According to the Nedeco study (17),
the railroad freight is about 25 Fmk per ton. This probably
means gross freight, because the reduction referred to above
is 20-30%.
The freight reduction has been tied down to fixed dates,
beginning partly on December 15 and partly on January 1, and
ending correspondingly on May 15 or April 30. A system of
(16) The Committee Report 1968, B98:The report of Railroad
Tariff Reduction Reparation Committee.
(17) A Study of Transportation in Finland, Appendix VI:
The harbors and their traffic. December, 1965, Den Haag.
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fixed dates is apparently desired by the State Railways.
Sometimes the opinion is voiced that enlarging the
winter traffic of railroads would mean increasing the equipment
of the State Railroads and raising the expenses. Lengthening
the transportation season of the railroads would probably
not require additional equipment and primary expenses.
Increasing actual transportation efficiency can add to the
expenses but there are no studies on this subject, at least
not in comparison with sea transportations. In any event
the goods are often loaded first into a railway car at the
factory.
In principle, the freight balance system mentioned
above amounts to dividing the Government aid between the
different harbors. The distance, by railway, from Kemi
to Vaskiluoto is 518 km, -and from Kemi to Kaskinen 552 km.
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7. Sweden
The conditions in Sweden have already been referred to.
It is interesting because their side of the Bothnian Bay is
in many ways the mirror copy of the Finnish side. The ice
conditions change with the wind. In the East they are easier
when the east wind blows, and in the West when the west wind
blows. The structure of industry is similar: ore, steel,
and wood products.
Between May 15 and December 15 Lulea exports about
4.5 million tons of ore. This is 95% of the annual output
of the mine at Malmberget. The rest, 5%, is taken by train
to Narvik. All of Kiruna's ore is taken to Narvik.
Norrlands Jarnverk exports 110,000 tons of steel from
its own dock at Lulea. About 20,000 tons leave from Umei
and an equal amount from Uddevalla. Uddevalla can compete
with Lulea even in summer because it can offer the advantages
of small ships. The finished products are more suitable
as cargoes for the small ships.
The traffic of Sweden is about 2/3 of the Finnish
traffic if the ore of Lulea is not taken into account.
The winter harbors are Umei, Sundsvall and Gavle and
Gothenburg - Uddevalla. Narvik does not qualify as a winter
harbor for the industry on the Swedish Gulf of Bothnia.
It is interesting to note that SCA (Svenska Cellulosa
Ab) has stopped sea transportations from Piitime and brings
its export goods to Ume& both summer and winter. 200,000
tons of cardboard and lumber are brought by train to the
modern terminal of Holmsund in big units. The distance by
rail is 340 km.
In addition, an interesting committee report has been (18)
published in Sweden which assumes that 75% of icebreaker costs
occur in the Bothnian Bay. With us the corresponding figure
is probably 35%. The committee suggests acceptance of the
(18) The Government Navigation Fees, Memorandum published by
the Board of Navigation in 1968. Stenc. K 1968:9.
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Finnish ice class system as a technical solution for merchant
ships. As an economical solution, Sjdfartsverket (that is,
the Swedish Bureau of Navigation) should be made to bring
profit, i.e., each operation (including winter navigation)
should be economically self-supporting. The winter fee
should be divided between the ship and the cargo. The ships
fee should be escalated according to the advance of the
winter and the accessibility of the harbors, thus corres-
ponding to actual expenses. The time limits and the fees
have been made according to a normal winter. In the lowest
ice class the charge would be from 3-6 Swedish crowns/ net
register ton. The suggestion has naturally met with fierce
opposition in Norrland because there it would mean considerable
increase in transportation expenses. The Swedish shipowners
have only slight interest in winter navigation, and the pro-
portion of foreign ships is greater here than in other
Swedish trades. They also carry on a public discussion about
the chances of survival for navigation in Norrland (19).
(19) Per Bering: Is Navigation Necessary for Norrland or are
There Better Transportational Alternatives?
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IV. SUMMARY
The participants in winter transportation in the
Bothnian Bay are the icebreakers, the railroads, and the
merchant ships. The first two are state owned, while the
third functions under strict state supervision in winter
navigation. Accordingly, the role of the state is of primary
significance in this area, although the costs of running the
merchant ships are the responsibility of the shipowners
themselves.
After icebreakers reached their present standard, the
fact that this was not the final solution to the problem of
winter transportation has been a surprise to many. On the
contrary, the number of problems has not diminished in the
least, and the demand for good winter transportation still
awaits realization.
According to the study by the Finnish Shipowners'
Association, in the winters 1965-1966 and 1966-1967, the
average extra costs for the Bothnian Bay winter navigation
were 35:85 Finnmarks per ton, with a variation of +10% and
-20%. The data collected by the present writer present
considerably higher records. The sum total of the damages
of the examples given above is practically identical with
the above-mentioned freight balance of the railroads, and
the damages per ton appear to be about three times the amount
of the railroad freight to the ports in the South. The cost
of the icebreaker allowance is, at its highest, practically
the same as the abovementioned unreduced railroad freight.
It is to be noted that the operating costs of icebreakers
are about 40% of their total cost. The additional cost to
the ships, caused by winter navigation, is about one third
of the railroad freight and the freight allowance for
Northern Finland is about one fifth of the railroad freight.
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It is interesting to note that the difficulties of the
ships are greatest during mild winters, and those of the
industry in cold winters. One of the parties always
suffers.
Icebreakers are naturally necessary in Finland, and
their importance grows with winter navigation. It is a
matter of opinion whether the greater part of the costs of
icebreakers should be society's investments as are the high-
ways and the water ways. The practical situation has clearly
indicated that we drift to expensive solutions if we forget
the capital costs of icebreakers. As we have seen, there
are many reasons to study winter navigation in the Bothnian
Bay. It seems necessary to attempt to clarify the optimal
costs of the whole transportation system, and not only some
parts of it. If we consider the matter even superficially
we realize that sea transportation just before the closing
of the ports, and especially in the first weeks after
reopening them, is extremely expensive. It may be that in
the future the attitudes toward winter navigation will be
different, and the old preconceived notions will have to be
changed. The winter transportation system of the Bothnian
Bay can certainly be managed better than it is at the present,
but it can scarcely be advanced by lengthening the navigation
season.
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